How a K-Award Has Advanced a Research Career: a Search for Unity in Diversity

Slide presentation from the AHRQ 2008 conference showcasing Agency research and projects.

Slide Presentation from the AHRQ 2008 Annual Conference

On September 10, 2008, Christopher Keane, made this presentation at the 2008 Annual Conference. Select to access the PowerPoint® presentation (802 KB; Plugin Software Help).

Slide 1

How a K-Award Has Advanced a Research Career: a Search for Unity in Diversity

  • Christopher Keane
    Assistant Professor
    Behavioral & Community Health Sciences
    University of Pittsburgh
    crkcity@pitt.edu
  • AHRQ Conference 2008.

Slide 2

Disciplinary Expertise Prior to K-Award:

  • Experimental design and survey design.
  • Statistical analysis, regression etc.
  • Sociology of public health.
  • Organizational theory relating to contracting.
  • Biology (had never used in my health studies).

Slide 3

New Disciplinary Approaches Mid-K-Award:

  • Experimental economics & game theory.
  • Modeling of complex adaptive systems.
  • Philosophy of sociality.
  • Additional organizational theory & practice.
  • Neuroeconomics & social neurology.
  • Psychology of behavior change.
    • Challenge: How to Integrate These Diverse Approaches?

Slide 4

New Disciplinary Approaches to Study of Trust & Cooperation (One Unifying Theme)

  • Experimental games of trust & cooperation.
  • Social neurology of trust & cooperation.
  • Modeling trust & cooperation in systems.
  • Philosophy of trust & cooperation.
  • Organizational theories of trust & cooperation.
  • Psychology of behavior change & trust.

Slide 5

New Disciplinary Approaches to Study of Trust & Cooperation in Health: New Partners

  • Trust & cooperation games in food choices.
    • Two new partners from experimental economic.
  • Social neurology of trust & cooperation.
    • No partners, yet.
  • Modeling trust & cooperation in health systems.
    • Two new partners, computational modelers.
  • Philosophy of trust & cooperation.
    • A philosopher & computational modeler of trust.
  • Organizational theories of trust & cooperation.
    • Several new partners from other departments.
  • Psychology of behavior change & trust.
    • Several new partners.

Slide 6

New Disciplinary Approaches to Study of Trust & Cooperation in Health: New Grants (2008 onwards)

  • Trust & cooperation games in food choices.
    • Funded study of my experimental game with vouchers.
  • Social neurology of trust & cooperation.
    • Incorporated theory into above, could study directly.
  • Modeling trust & cooperation in health systems.
    • Recently funded study of public health systems.
  • Philosophy of trust & cooperation.
    • Incorporated into above studies, especially the game.
  • Organizational theories of trust & cooperation.
    • Incorporated into study of public health systems.
  • Psychology of behavior change & trust.
    • Incorporated into above and HIV study (likely funded).

Slide 7

New Disciplinary Approaches to Study of Trust & Cooperation in Health:

  • Trust & cooperation games in food choices.
    • Funded study of my experimental game with vouchers.
  • Approaches:
    • Conduct several experimental games followed by interviewing.
    • Modeling behavior using conditional rules.
    • Computational simulation of the behavior and social networking.

Slide 8

New Disciplinary Approaches to Study of Trust & Cooperation in Health:

  • Trust & cooperation games in food choices.
    • Funded study of my experimental game with vouchers.
  • Commitment, Cooperation & Dilemma in Health Choices:
    Modeling Inter-temporal and Interpersonal Coordination.

Slide 9

Commitment, Cooperation & Dilemma in Health Choices

  • Trust & cooperation games in food choices.
    • Funded study of my experimental game with vouchers.
  • What food types do people pick when sharing with others, as opposed to when choosing only for themselves?
  • How do unhealthy or healthy food choice behaviors spread through social networks?

Slide 10

Trust Game: At start of game, two players are each given a $10 voucher by the experimenter.

  • All gifts are doubled, = $20 in vouchers
    1. Choose whether or not to give your voucher:
      1. Give (circled in red)
      2. Keep
    2. Choose the type of food voucher:
      1. Pizza (circled in red)
      2. McDonald's
      3. Café One
      4. Café Two
  • We present the restaurant name, location, menu, for each restaurant.
  • The Cafés offer healthier options, but we don't label them healthy or unhealthy. All are on campus.
  • Investigators will rate the restaurants with the Nutrition Environment Measures Study in Restaurants (NEMS-R) (Saelens et al. 2007).
  • Please don't quote without permission of author, Christopher Keane.

Slide 11

Trust Game: At start of game, two players are each given a $10 voucher by the experimenter.

  • All gifts are doubled, = $20 in vouchers.
  • Proposer (P) makes 1st move—Responder (R) makes 2nd move.
  • P keeps the $10 voucher—R keeps the $10 voucher—P & R both keep (reciprocal selfishness).
  • P keeps the $10 voucher—R keeps the $10 voucher—P gives and R keeps (P trusts, but R is selfish.
  • P gives the $10 voucher—R gives the $10 voucher—P gives and R gives back (reciprocal giving).
  • P keeps the $10 voucher—R gives the $10 voucher—P keeps, but R gives (not likely).

Slide 12

Four Variations of the Game

  • Inter-personal version—Inter-temporal version.
  • Turn taking:
    • n=40 students, randomly assigned to P or R—n= 20 students, each plays alone.
  • Choice 1
    • P keeps or donates $10*—At Time 1, player invests $10 for Time 2 or takes it home*
  • Choice 2
    • R keeps or donates $10*—At Time 2, player can keep or invest $10 in Time 3*
    • Any donation to other player is doubled—Any investment in future time point is doubled.
  • Choose at once: "dictator" version
    • n = 40 students—n=20 students*
    • One player chooses the payoff distribution in one decision*--One player can choose the payoff distribution in one decision*
  • All subjects choose type of $10 restaurant voucher (choose 1 or 4 restaurants)
  • Please don't quote without permission of author, Christopher Keane

Slide 13

Trust Game: At start of game, two players are each given a $10 voucher by the experimenter.

  • All gifts are doubled, = $20 in vouchers
  • Proposer makes 1st move—Responder makes 2nd move
    • P keeps or gives the $10 voucher—R keeps or gives the $10 voucher
  • Please don't quote without permission of author, Christopher Keane

Slide 14

Trust Game with Restaurant Vouchers, Between Proposer & Responder: One Pattern I Hypothesize Is Common

  • Slide divides ovals into two columns: Intending and Implementing
  • Label on side says "Mirroring"
  • Label at bottom says "MIrror Intention" and "Mirror Implementation"
    • First oval at top left shows "R's View," in which P gives (Pizza) and R gives
      • Reciprocal arrows indicate "Search for Balance"
    • Second oval at top right shows "R's View," in which P keeps (Cafe 1) and R keeps (Cafe 1)
      • Reciprocal arrows indicate "Search for Balance"
    • Reciprocal arrows between these two ovals indicate "Search for Balance"
    • Third oval, under first oval and between "Intending" and "MIrror Intention," shows R's View of P's View, in which R Gives (Pizza) and P Gives Pizza
      • Reciprocal arrows indicate "Search for Balance"
    • Fourth oval, under second oval and between "Implementing" and "MIrror Implementation," shows R's View of P's View, in which R Keeps (Cafe 1) and P Keeps (Cafe 1)
      • Reciprocal arrows indicate "Search for Balance"
    • Reciprocal arrows between bottom two ovals indicate "Search for Balance"
    • Reciprocal arrows between top and bottom ovals indicate "Search for Analogous Balancing"
  • Christopher Keane, 2008, Please don't quote without permission of the author

Slide 15

Intending & Implementing as Mirrored Balancing

  • Slide divides ovals into two columns: Intending and Implementing
  • Label on side says "Mirroring"
  • Label at bottom says "MIrror Intention" and "Mirror Implementation"
    • First oval, under Intending, shows "Focal Domain," in which arrows signifying "Search for Balance" link smaller ovals labeled "Simulate Condition" and "Simulate Action"
    • Second oval, under Implementing, shows "Focal Domain," in which arrows signifying "Search for Balance" link "Perceive Condition" and "Try Action"
      • Reciprocal arrows between these two ovals signify "Search for Balance"
    • Third oval, above "MIrror Intention," shows "Mirror Domain," in which arrows signifying "Search for Balance" link smaller ovals labeled "Simulate Condition" and "Simulate Action"
    • Fourth oval, above "Mirror Implementation," shows "Focal Domain," in which arrows signifying "Search for Balance" link "Perceive Condition" and "Try Action"
      • Reciprocal arrows between these two bottom ovals signify "Search for Balance"
  • Christopher Keane, 2008, Please don't quote without permission of the author

Slide 16

Significance

  • Food is often a "social choice" that partly depends on what we project others want. Social eating may affect college students' long-term eating habits & health.
  • Inter-temporal and inter-personal cooperation and trust may operate similarly. A clear computational model may elucidate this more general inter-agent trust & cooperation.
  • What we eat is a function of social ecology, including the food environment: what restaurants are available locally, what social networks surround our eating.
  • A similar framework for modeling trust & cooperation may apply similarly between health organizations.

Slide 17

Modeling Public (P) & Private (R) Provider Decisions: A Trust Game?

  • (Give = Provide Care to Uninsured)
  • Slide divides ovals into two columns: Intending and Implementing
  • Label on side says "Mirroring"
  • Label at bottom says "MIrror Intention" and "Mirror Implementation"
    • Top left oval, under "Intending," depicts R's View, in which P Gives and R Gives while reciprocal arrows signify a "Search for Balance"
    • Top right oval, under "Implementing," depict R's View, in which P Keeps and R Keeps while reciprocal arrows indicate a "Search for Balance"
      • Reciprocal arrows between these two ovals signify "Search for Balance"
    • Bottom left oval, over "Mirror Intention," depicts R's View of P's View, in which P Gives and R Gives while reciprocal arrows signify a "Search for Balance"
    • Bottom right oval, over "Mirror Implementation," depicts R's view of P's View, in which P Keeps and R Keeps while reciprocal arrows signify a "Search for Balance"
      • Reciprocal arrows between these two ovals signify "Search for Balance"
  • Keane 2008, using data from Keane 2005—Please don't quote without permission of the author

Slide 18

New Disciplinary Approaches to Study of Trust & Cooperation in Health:

  • Modeling trust & cooperation in health systems
    • Recently funded study of public health systems
  • Organizational theories of trust & cooperation
    • Incorporated into study of public health systems
  • "Adaptive Systems Indicators" for Public Health System Emergency Response

Slide 19

"Adaptive Systems Indicators" for Public Health System Emergency Response

  • Designed to capture the adaptive system processes of public health emergency response.
  • Assumes public health systems are dynamic networks of human actors who consider:
    • Inter-organizational trust in their networks,
    • The relative complexity of emergency response rules,
    • The Diversity or partners, degree of centralization,
    • Tension between top-down & bottom-up decisions.
  • These factors predict system performance (Choi & Brower 2006, Comfort 1999, 2005, Epstein 2006, Keane 2005, 2008 Axelrod & Cohen 2000)
    • Christopher Keane, 2008, Please don't quote without permission of author.

Slide 20

"Adaptive Systems Indicators" for Public Health System Emergency Response

  • Measures the properties of networks of public health decision makers that we hypothesize result in effective emergency response:
    • Inter-organizational trust
    • Degree of centralization-decentralization
    • Connectivity
    • Diversity and participation in decision-making
    • Necessary redundancy in networks
    • Relatively simple decision rules
  • These factors predict system performance (Choi & Brower 2006, Comfort 1999, 2005, Epstein 2006, Keane 2005, 2008, Axelrod & Cohen 2000)
    • Christopher Keane, 2008, Please don't quote without permission of author.

Slide 21

"Adaptive Systems Indicators" (ASIs) for Public Health System Emergency Response

  • Inter-organizational trust
  • Degree of centralization-decentralization
  • Connectivity
  • Diversity and participation in decisionmaking
  • Necessary redundancy in networks
  • Relatively simple decision rules
  • Initial plan is to measure the ASIs in (a) 12 to 20 public health system networks, including local health departments and their private partners, and (b) approx. 300 local health departments.
  • The ASIs would supplement existing emergency response guidelines.
    • The ASI is my contributions to a R01.

Slide 22

Hypothetical Public Health System Legal Network

  • Diagram shows:
    • Red arrows from:
      • Public Health to Schools
      • Schools to Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
    • Yellow arrow from Mental Health to Transit
    • White arrow from Transit to Mental Health
  • We designated 3 levels of mandated relationship, with 3 as the most directive:
    • White: Level 1
    • Yellow: Level 2
    • Red: Level 3

Slide 23

State Statutory Relationship Worksheet (network matrix)

  • Matrix has six columns, with these headings in top row:
    • (Unlabeled)—Public Health—EMS—Mental Health—Schools—Transit
    • Public Health—X—Red 3—(blank)—(blank)—(blank)
    • EMS—0—X—(blank)—0—(blank)
    • Mental Health—(blank)—(blank)—X—(blank)—Yellow 2
    • Schools—(blank)—Red 3—(blank)—X—(blank)
    • Transit—(blank)—(blank)—White 1—(blank)—X
  • Rows indicate the organization that state law requires to Initiate contact with other organization (Column).
  • The network framework is my contribution to R01 grant

Slide 24

Integrating New Approaches to Study of Public Health (PH) Systems & Health Behavior:

  • Modeling trust in adaptive network
  • Organizational theories of trust & decisions.
    • Integrated Study of:
      • Adaptive Systems Indicators, &
      • Public Health System Legal Network for
      • Computational Modeling of PH Response System to improve Public Health System Emergency Response
  • Trust & cooperation games in food choices
    • Current study of trust and social food choice
      • Experimental trust game with restaurant vouchers
      • Computational modeling of trust & projection in networks
  • Experimental trust games with policymakers?
    • I'm working on this one

Slide 25

Dilemma: How to flexibly expand expertise via pre-planned mentors?

  • Experimental economics & game theory
  • Neuroeconomics & social neurology
  • Computational modeling of adaptive systems
  • Philosophy of sociality
  • New organizational theory & practice,
  • Psychology of trust and behavior change etc.
  • One Strategy: Use "Coordinating mentor"

Slide 26

Planning Growth & Inter-Disciplinarity in my K-Award

  • Unlike a traditional grant, career award allows training, to develop expertise in new areas.
  • Therefore requires more flexibility for research agenda, to acquire and apply new ideas.
  • Perhaps use "Coordinating mentor."
  • Flexible approach resulted in publication in very different of prestigious journals, representing sociology, anthropology, health policy, public health practice, medical practice, health management (publications in over a dozen different journals), and a diversity of grants.
  • Diversity of research with unified theory.
Current as of February 2009
Internet Citation: How a K-Award Has Advanced a Research Career: a Search for Unity in Diversity. February 2009. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. http://www.ahrq.gov/news/events/conference/2008/Keane.html