Linking Transparency, Patient Safety, and Quality of Care (Text Version)

Slide presentation from the AHRQ 2009 conference.

On September 15, 2009, Richard C. Boothman, Thomas H. Gallagher, Timothy B. McDonald, and Eric J. Thomas made this presentation at the 2009 Annual Conference. Select to access the PowerPoint® presentation (5.2 MB). Plugin Software Help.

 


Slide 1

Slide 1. Linking Transparency, Patient Safety, and Quality of Care: Innovative Institutional Programs and Future Directions

Linking Transparency, Patient Safety, and Quality of Care
Innovative Institutional Programs and
Future Directions

Richard C. Boothman, JD
Thomas H. Gallagher, MD
Timothy B. McDonald, MD, JD
Eric J. Thomas, MD, MPH

Slide 2

Slide 2. Session Objectives

Session Objectives

  • Describe innovative institutional transparency efforts, including programs to promote reporting of adverse events and errors to institutions and disclosing these events to patients.
  • Describe the conceptual and practical linkages between event reporting, safety culture, and quality improvement.
  • Highlight future developments that could strengthen transparency and the link between transparency and quality at the institutional and national level.

 

Slide 3

Slide 3. Agenda

Agenda

TopicSpeakerTime
Introduction, session overview Transparency, safety, and quality: conceptual considerationsGallagher15 min
Transparency and safety cultureThomas15 min
Promoting transparency at the institutional levelMcDonald15 min
What now?  Innovations to promote transparency at the institutional and national levelBoothman15 min
DiscussionAll30 min

 

Slide 4

Slide 4. Case

Case

  • 29 year-old healthy male cared for by PCP and local hospital for recurring epistaxis
  • After several months, referred to academic medical center ED—presented ill, with SOB, epistaxis, hemopytsis, low platelets.
  • CT scan shows large lung mass, thought to be tumor (less likely blood clot).
  • Bronchoscopy attempted, finds free blood in lungs. 
  • Continued deterioration, recommendation for interventional radiology to embolize bleeding source

 

Slide 5

Slide 5. Case (continued)

(Case continued)

  • IR attempts biopsy, retrieves only clot.  Neoplasm still highest on differential.
  • While healthcare team is meeting, patient arrests and dies.  Autopsy finds large PE with pulmonary hemorrhage.
  • Communication with family immediately after death is challenging-cultural barriers, uncertainty about what happened, sudden and unexpected demise of young patient.
  • Security called to remove distraught family—first time risk management becomes aware of event.

 

Slide 6

Slide 6. Follow-up disclosure meeting

Follow-up disclosure meeting

  • One week later meeting held with 10 family members, unannounced trial lawyer, 5 physicians, 2 risk managers.
  • Clinical care thought to be reasonable; MD thought process shared with family.
  • Family perceptions addressed, misconceptions corrected.
  • Family could see shared grief.
  • Family's anger heard, appropriate apologies made, lessons taken back to management for follow-up.

Slide 7

Slide 7. Transparency, safety, and quality

Transparency, safety, and quality

  • Transparency long recognized as key to safety culture and healthcare quality
  • Yet a decade after To Err Is Human, major gaps in transparency persist
  • Healthcare workers experience multiple mixed messages about transparency
  • No accountability around transparency
  • Limited transparency becomes path of least resistance
  • Missed opportunities to promote greater synergy among transparency practices

 

Slide 8

Slide 8. Practices in transparent healthcare organizations

Practices in transparent healthcare organizations

  • Discuss events with colleagues, other team members
  • Formal event reporting
  • Disclose event to patient
  • Share lessons learned back with clinicians
  • Required external reporting
  • Optional external reporting
    • Standard quality measures
  • Extreme transparency
    • CEO blog
  • Other aspects of transparency
    • Clinical information (shared decision-making)
    • Price

 

Slide 9

Slide 9. How transparent are we?

How transparent are we?

Event reporting 2009 AHRQ Patient Safety Culture survey-52% of staff reported no errors in the last 12 months 2005 Physician survey (n>2000)-65% unaware their hospital had an error reporting system. Disclosure to patient Only 1/3 of harmful errors disclosed to patients Those disclosures that do occur often go poorly. Feedback of lessons learned to clinicians 2005 Physician survey-18% of physicians agreed that current mechanisms to inform them about safety problems were adequate. Suggests shortcomings in our current approach to promoting transparency

 

Slide 10

Slide 10. Comparing Patient and Physician Ratings of Disclosure Quality

Comparing Patient and Physician Ratings of Disclosure Quality

 

Slide 11

Slide 11. Transparency, accountability, and quality

Transparency, accountability, and quality

  • Current paradigm
    • Culture of blame, shame, fear inhibit openness
    • Errors mostly represent system breakdowns
    • Greater openness promotes quality through event analysis, implementing prevention plans
  • Reality check
    • Errors mixture of individual and system breakdown
    • Transparency also promotes quality by encouraging low performers to improve and by deterrent effect
      • Performing poorly on report cards a potent stimulus
      • Accountability for transparency required
  • Current approaches to transparency not integrated

 

Slide 12

Slide 12. Are current approaches to transparency integrated?

Are current approaches to transparency integrated?

  • Key transparency practices largely segregated by specialty
    • Nurses report events to institution
    • Physicians disclose events to patients
  • Most safety culture surveys measure event reporting but not disclosure attitudes or practices
  • Risk management and quality/safety programs often separated
  • Training usually addresses one transparency practice in isolation
    • Disclosure training rarely addresses event reporting to institution or communicating about events with colleagues

 

Slide 13

Slide 13. Are different transparency attitudes correlated?

Are different transparency attitudes correlated?

  • 2005 Physician survey
    • Physicians who strongly agreed that serious errors should be disclosed to patients twice as likely to strongly agree that serious errors should be reported to hospital
    • Similar relationship between MD support for disclosing minor errors to patients and reporting minor errors to hospital
  • Considerable anecdotal experience supports hypothesis that different transparency practices may be related

 

Slide 14

Slide 14. Implications of an integrated approach to transparency

Implications of an integrated approach to transparency

  • What our are goals for transparency?
    • Are transparency's deterrent, embarrassment effects good or bad?
  • Transparency is a skill, not just an attitude
    • Should training address reporting, communicating with colleagues, and disclosure in tandem?
    • Interprofessional implications
      • What are the real barriers to “speaking up?”
  • Will organizations adopt processes to ensure accountability around transparency?
    • Which of these will be publicly reported?
  • Will organizations compete on transparency?

 

Slide 15

Slide 15. Enhancing transparency, improving quality

Enhancing transparency, improving quality

  • Transparency and safety culture: Eric Thomas
  • Innovative institutional transparency programs: Tim McDonald
  • Future developments in transparency: Rick Boothman

 

Slide 16

Slide 16. Transparency and Safety Culture

Transparency and Safety Culture

 

Slide 17

Slide 17. Safety Climate

Safety Climate

The culture in this ICU makes it easy to learn from the errors of others.

Medical errors are handled appropriately in this ICU.

I know the proper channels to direct questions regarding patient safety in this ICU.

I am encouraged by my colleagues to report any patient safety concerns I may have.

I receive appropriate feedback about my performance.

I would feel safe being treated here as a patient.

Sexton et al. BMC Health Services Research 2006;6:44.

 

Slide 18

Slide 18. Safety Climate

Safety Climate

  • Improve safety climate by:
    • Improving incident report systems
    • Executive walkrounds or safety rounds
    • Increasing staff participation in RCAs and other efforts to learn from errors

Hudson et al. Contemporary Critical Care 2009;7:

 

Slide 19

Slide 19. Safety Climate

Safety Climate

  • Executive Walkrounds Study:
    • Randomized 24 clinical units to receive EWRs or usual patient safety activities and measured safety climate of nurses before and after the walkrounds
    • At baseline the experimental and control groups had similar safety climate scores
    • After the intervention, 72.9% of nurses in the walkrounds group reported a positive safety climate versus only 52.5% in the control group

Thomas et al. BMC Health Services Research 2005;5:28. For other data on walkrounds also see Frankel et al. Health Serv Res 2008; Jul 20:2.

 

Slide 20

Slide 20. Teamwork Climate

Teamwork Climate

It is easy for personnel in this ICU to ask questions when there is something that they do not understand.

I have the support I need from other personnel to care for patients.

Nurse input is well received in this ICU.

In this ICU, it is difficult to speak up if I perceive a problem with patient care.

Disagreements in this ICU are resolved appropriately (i.e., not who is right, but what is best for the patient).

The physicians and nurses here work together as a well-coordinated team.

Sexton et al. BMC Health Services Research 2006;6:44.

 

Slide 21

Slide 21. Chart Showing Teamwork Climate and BSIs Across Michigan ICUs

Teamwork Climate and BSIs Across Michigan ICUs:
“No BSI” is > 5 consecutive months without BSI.

Bar graph depicting % of respondents within an ICU reporting good teamwork climate by 3 categories

  1. No BSI 21%
  2. No BSI 44%
  3. No BSI 31%

Strongest item level predictor: caregivers feel comfortable speaking up if they perceive a problem with patient care.

Slide from Bryan Sexton
 

Slide 22

Slide 22. RN reports of Teamwork Climate and Subsequent RN Turnover

RN reports of Teamwork Climate and Subsequent RN Turnover

Bar graph depicting RN Turnover in that Quartile 3 years later.

Data from the University of Texas at Houston Memorial Hermann Center for Healthcare Quality and Safety
 

Slide 23

Slide 23. Teamwork climate

Teamwork climate

  • Improve teamwork climate by:
    • SBAR training
    • Briefings
    • Daily goals checklists
    • Shadowing other providers

Hudson et al. Contemporary Critical Care 2009;7:

 

Slide 24

Slide 24. Transparency and Safety Culture

Transparency and Safety Culture

 

Slide 25

Slide 25. Promoting Transparency at the Institutional Level

Promoting Transparency at the Institutional Level

 

Slide 26

Slide 26. Condition Predicate to

Condition Predicate to "Transparency"

 

Slide 27

Slide 27. Condition Predicate to

Condition Predicate to "Transparency"

  • Courage.. and Leadership

 

Slide 28

Slide 28. How can we

How can we "encourage" institutions and care givers to be transparent?

 

Slide 29

Slide 29. How can we

How can we "encourage" institutions and care givers to be transparent?

  • Deal with the drivers of human behavior

 

Slide 30

Slide 30. How can we

How can we "encourage" institutions and care givers to be transparent?

  • Deal with the drivers of human behavior
    • Fear
    • Greed
    • Ego - soul
    • One we can leave out

 

Slide 31

Slide 31. How can we

How can we "encourage" institutions and care givers to be transparent?

  • Deal with the drivers of human behavior
    • Fear
      • Support structure-patients, families and providers
      • Education
      • Attack "truth to power" problems head-on
    • Greed
      • Financial incentives, disincentives for reporting
      • Tie to employment, privileges - OPPE, credentialing
      • Show the ROI - process improvements, claims
    • Ego - soul
      • Adopt principles of "just culture"
      • Handle occurrence reports with discretion
      • Focus on systems unless reckless, repetitive behavior

Slide 32

Slide 32. On the educational front: ACGME program director survey data

On the educational front:
ACGME program director survey data

  • Most believe being transparent and honest is important
  • Future depends on resident physicians
  • Few feel competent
    • Little training
    • Lack of infrastructure in "real life"
    • Mixed messages from institutional leadership, insurers, risk management
    • Desire for clear articulated and approved principles

 

Slide 33

Slide 33. ACGME core competencies

ACGME core competencies

  • Patient Care
  • Medical Knowledge
  • Practice-Based Learning & Improvement
  • Interpersonal and Communication Skills
  • Professionalism
  • Systems-based Practices

 

Slide 34

Slide 34. Elements of a  
Elements of a "Transparent" Response to Adverse Event Process

  • Reporting
  • Investigation
  • Communication
  • Apology with remediation
  • Process and performance improvement
  • Data tracking and analysis

 

Slide 35

Slide 35. Elements of a  
Elements of a "Transparent" Response to Adverse Event Process

  • Within the context of the Core Competencies
    • Reporting - all six competencies involved
    • Investigation - SBP & PBL & I
    • Communication - Professionalism and com skills
    • Apology with remediation - Professionalism
    • Process and performance improvement
    • Data tracking and analysis - PBL & I
    • All done in the context of institutional oversight

 

Slide 36

Slide 36. Resident Reporting

Resident Reporting

  • Must report 5 unsafe conditions or "near misses per year"

 

Slide 37

Slide 37. After reporting

After reporting

  • Degree of harm assessed
  • If harm, investigation ensues
  • Must engage the family
  • RCA depending on severity
  • Consideration of "care for the care giver"
    • Life After Death: The Aftermath of Perioperative Catastrophes
      Gazoni et al. Anesth Analg.2008; 107: 591-600
  • Hold bills

 

Slide 38

Slide 38. Power of engaging families in the aftermath of a tragic event

Power of engaging families in the aftermath of a tragic event

 

Slide 39

Slide 39. Association of perceived medical errors with resident distress and empathy: a prospective longitudinal study

Association of perceived medical errors with resident distress and empathy: a prospective longitudinal study

  • West et al. JAMA. 2006 296(6): 1071-8.
  • "Self-perceived medical errors are common among I.M. residents and are associated with substantial personal distress. Personal distress and decreased empathy are associated with increased odds of future errors.reciprocal cycle." Must consider "care for the care giver" and methods to maintain trust between provider and patient/family.

 

Slide 40

Slide 39. Association of perceived medical errors with resident distress and empathy: a prospective longitudinal study

Future possibilities and opportunities

  • Deal with the drivers of human behavior
    • Fear
      • Federal & state legislative changes
      • NPDB & State licensing
    • Greed
      • Personal asset protection if transparent
    • Ego - soul
      • Expanded adoption of "just culture"
      • Screening prior to medical school
      • Emotional intelligence assessment tools
      • Values drive behaviors which drive performance

 

Slide 41

Slide 41.

 

 In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act.

George Orwell
 

 

Slide 42

Slide 42.

Habit #2: Begin with the End in Mind.

Stephen R. Covey
 

 

Slide 43

Slide 43. What do patients want? What do patients deserve?

What do patients want?

What do patients deserve?
 

 

Slide 44

Slide 44. Truthful Explanation

 

Truthful Explanation
 

 

Slide 45

Slide 45. Accountability

Accountability
 

 

Slide 46

Slide 46. Apology and Compensation when warranted

Apology and Compensation when warranted
 

 

Slide 47

Slide 47. What do caregivers want? What do caregivers deserve?

What do caregivers want?

What do caregivers deserve?
 

 

Slide 48

Slide 48. Truthful Explanation

Truthful Explanation
 

 

Slide 49

Slide 49. Reasonable Benchmark against which you judge their actions

Reasonable Benchmark against which you judge their actions
 

 

Slide 50

Slide 50. Support

 Support
 

 

Slide 51

Slide 51. What do hospitals want? What do hospitals deserve?

What do hospitals want?

What do hospitals deserve?
 

 

Slide 52

Slide 52. Truthful Explanation

 

 

Truthful Explanation
 

 

Slide 53

Slide 53. Opportunity to be Accountable

Opportunity to be Accountable
 

 

Slide 54

Slide 54. Opportunity to Improve

 Opportunity to Improve
 

 

Slide 55

Slide 55. The very best risk management is . . .


The very best risk management is to make no medical mistakes

The next best is not to make the same mistake again

“Deny and defend” and learning from mistakes are mutually exclusive

 

Slide 56

Slide 56. Institutional Patient Safety Concept

Institutional Patient Safety Concept

Collection

Triage

Intervention, Investigation, Stabilization

Referral for Action

Measurement to Gauge Improvement

Educate with Lessons Learned, Facilitate Improvements in Patient Safety, QI

 

Slide 57

Slide 57. Define

Define "Disclosure"

  • Communicating with patients/families/caregivers
  • Following unanticipated medical outcome
  • And telling them the truth (or as close to it as we can come after the fact)

Slide 58

Slide 58. When an explanation is needed, . . .

When an apology is truly owed, every day that passes results in a new injury

When an explanation is needed, every day that passes further cements mistaken beliefs
 

 

Slide 59

Slide 59. University of Michigan's: Claims Management Principles

University of Michigan's
Claims Management Principles

We will compensate quickly and fairly when inappropriate medical care causes injury.

We will defend appropriate care vigorously.

We will reduce patient injuries (and claims) by learning from mistakes.
 

 

Slide 60

Slide 60. Key Questions:

Key Questions:

  • Was the care at issue "reasonable"?
  • Did the care adversely impact the patient's outcome?

 

Slide 61

Slide 61. U of M Claims Management Model

U of M Claims Management Model

  1. Assessment and Direction
  2. Investigation and Analysis of Risk and Value
  3. Medical Committee (3 months after notice)
  4. Engage Patient and hare Information
    • Litigation - Agree to Disagree, No Dialogue
    • Legal Office Assign to Counsel Litigate
    • Claims Committee Settle or Trial?
    • Settlement - Mistake/Injury
    • Claims Committee Settle or Trial?
  5. Agree no Claim

 

Slide 62

Slide 62. Pre Suit Investigation

Pre Suit Investigation

  1. Assessment and Direction
  2. Investigation and Analysis of Risk and Value
  3. Medical Committee (3 months after notice)
    • Peer Review
    • Clinical Quality Improvement
    • Educational Opportunities

 

Slide 63

Slide 63. Biggest Barrier:

Biggest Barrier:

Fear
 

 

Slide 64

Slide 64. The University of Michigan has two important advantages:

The University of Michigan has two important advantages:

  • Caregivers are employees of health system/medical school
    • Alignment of culture, ethics, financial consequences
  • Caregivers are insulated from personal financial ruin
    • Still accountable, but freedom from imminent, catastrophic financial consequences enables transparency, adherence to principles, wider and longer view of patient safety imperatives

 

Slide 65

Slide 65. Fear leads to:

Fear leads to:

  • Provider/hospital's abdication of responsibility to ask threshold question: what should my/our response be to this patient's unanticipated outcome?
  • Fight or flight rules, cedes control over this critical issue to lawyers/courtroom
  • And freezes efforts to improve in deference to the legal system

 

Slide 66

Slide 66. Ten years from now . . .

Ten years from now . . .

  • Information and honesty prevail
  • Incentives and penalties aligned to favor just response to patient and improve patient safety
  • Social safety net for patients so financial ruin is not main impetus for litigation
  • Protection for caregivers so financial ruin is not reason for deny and defend
  • Accountability (peer review), reasonable consequences based on "just culture" algorithm
  • Robust, widespread, compulsory data collection, sharing best practices, lessons learned and measurement of improvement

 

Slide 67

Slide 67. Litigation must change

  • Litigation must change
    • Last resort (cooling off period, mediation, other ADR)
    • Elimination of opportunistic exploitation of weaknesses (runaway verdicts/caps, early evaluation of merit, affidavits of merit, junk science limits)
    • Favor full disclosure (federal civil procedure trend)
    • Experts are key (Australia's "hot tubbing", use of "masters", elimination of charlatans)
    • Consideration of "health courts"

 

Slide 68

Slide 68.

The truth will set you free. But first, it will piss you off.

Gloria Steinem
 

Current as of December 2009
Internet Citation: Linking Transparency, Patient Safety, and Quality of Care (Text Version). December 2009. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. http://www.ahrq.gov/news/events/conference/2009/gallagher-boothman-mcdonald-thomas/index.html